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They had never met before. To an impartial observer there is little to distinguish the savage A from the savage C. Up to date all the ferocity which we associate with the word "savage" may have been dormant in both. In each other's presence new factors of stimulation and response begin to operate. Each wants food. Each wants the woman. Each wants to eliminate the other. Treating the woman as merely a passive factor, we have in action rudiments of the universal process of association, viz.
That is, they fight, one prevails, and is transformed from a socially indifferent personality into a master; the other yields, and is transformed from a socially indifferent personality into a slave. The group is changed from a diad into a triad. Both A and B, we may suppose, become subject to C, while the relation of neither A nor B to C is precisely identical with the previous relation of A and B to each other.
This process of individual and group reaction, remaking both the individuals and the groups, extends from the savage group of two or more to the most comprehensive and complex group of groups which ultimate civilization may develop. It is incessant. It is perpetually varying. It is the main movement, within which migrations, race-mixtures, wars, governments, constitutions, revolutions, reformations, federations, civilizations, are merely the more or less important episodes, or situations, or factors.
This whole process is the supreme fact within the reach. It is the final interpreter of each and every lesser fact which may attract human attention. Since this process, from beginning to end, from component to completeness, in its forms and in its forces, in its origins, its variations, and its tendencies, is the subject-matter which sociology proposes to investigate, the relation of every other science to sociology is fixed, not by the dictum of any scientist, but by the relation which the subject-matter and the methods of other sciences bear to knowledge of the entire social process.
To make the point more precise, we may distinguish the work of sociology in turn from that of ethnology, of history, and of economics.
Before passing to these specifications, or illustrations, we must provide for all necessary corrections of the personal equation. We will not assume, whether to the advantage or the disadvantage of either science, that any single man, still less a single fragment of his work, fairly represents the whole of his science.
We will not even venture to assume that our use of the material to be cited for illustration gives all the credit due to the writer from which it is taken. His own views of the final correlation of that material with other subjects of knowledge may be quite unobjectionable.
Our purpose is merely to illustrate the point that the same objective material may, in the form in which it appears in a given version of one of these sciences, have no interest for sociology whatever, or, on the other hand, it may be viewed in such relations as, at one and the same time, to furnish subject-matter for one of these sciences and also for sociology. To express the case from the point of view of desirability, as I see it, and of ultimate adjustment, as I predict it, there will presently be no apparently statical dualism or multipleism between the subject-matter of the other human sciences and sociology.
When every student of human life realizes that the reality which he tries to know is a one, not a many, each will regard the material of his immediate science, not as belonging to his science instead of belonging to another science, but as being to some extent the common material of several sciences, or at most as held in trusteeship by his science for its final use in the complete science.
Without passing judgment upon the expressed or implied correlations in which the author views this material, we may repeat our abstract propositions in terms of the particulars which he schedules.
If there be a science or sciences that are content to discover, describe, compare, and classify such details as these, and therewith to let the matter rest, such sciences may be credited with a preserve of their own, from which sociology holds itself unconcernedly aloof.
With these details, simply as details, or merely as foils reciprocally to display each other as curiosities, sociology has no manner of interest.
If the items thus considered are the subject-matter of any science, sociology is not likely to disturb either its possession or its title. On the other hand, every one of these details has occurred somewhere along in the course of the process in which rudimentary men and rudimentary human associations evolve into developed personalities and complex associations.
With the whence, and the how, and the why, and the whither of this process sociology is supremely concerned. If any of the details in question can be brought into such visible relation with this social process, and in the precise measure in which they can be made to shed light upon the process, they come within the ken of sociology. Thus the most spectacular detail, like a racial peculiarity, or a ceremonial anomaly which remains unaccounted for, may be the chief. It would have no value at all for sociology.
If, however, it could be made to yield never so slight evidence about the facts, or the forms, or the forces, or the conditions, or the laws of the social process, to just that extent it would come to be the common material of sociology and of the science which exhibits it in the museum.
In the same way we may distinguish between the object of attention in sociology and the subject-matter beyond which certain types of mind do not pry in studying history.
In his Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, chap. We are citing an author who is among the least liable to the charge of belonging to the former of the two types just indicated. On the one hand, if the items in the series were treated by the one type of historian, a minimum of relationship would appear between either of them and the others, or anything else. Each topic would be discussed very much as a landscape painter snatches from an environment an "effect" and puts it on canvass.
Volumes full of such detached, impressionistic sketches would go no farther toward making a science of history than an equal bulk of description of detached pieces of rock, culled from different parts of the world, would go toward making a science of geology.
No one with the least impulse toward generalization can imagine that information of that fragmentary sort is science. It may be worth getting for other purposes than science, and individuals may be as well within their rights in busying themselves with this sort of litter, as those who really devote themselves to science.
In itself, left in the uncriticised, unorganized, heterogeneous condition of facts set side by side, with no discrimination of relative worth, information about the past is of no more scientific value than the same number of miscellaneous items in the newspaper today. In the modern literature classed as "history " we accordingly find quaint and curious information in all stages of organization, from a minimum to a maximum of coherence.
Our argument is that sociology has no part nor lot with the type of history which is content to find out facts and there rest its case. Like all genuine science, sociology is not interested in facts as such. It is interested only in relations, meanings, valuations, in which facts reappear in essentials. One fact is worth no more than another, if its corre-. On the other hand, every fact in human experience has a value of its own as an index of the social process that emerges in part in the fact.
In so far as the historian hunts down facts for the purpose of finding the social process revealed in the facts, his interest is identical with that of the sociologist. The difference between them is again merely a difference of greater or less attention to different steps of one and the same approach to knowledge of the social reality. We might imitate a verbal distinction familiar in a related field, and say that as ethnography is to ethnology, so is historiography to historiology.
I would by no means concede that the subject-matter of sociology is confined to the past. It is still more concerned with interpretation of the social process in the present. This term " historiology " is suggested as a synonym for one segment of the arc of sociology, and merely as a temporary expedient in this particular part of the argument.
To point the contrast between mere discovery of details of past experience, and the work that the sociologists want to do, we may fairly call the former historiography and the latter historiology. The real progress of the historians toward promotion of science is not in the line of which many of them have recently grown so proud.
History does not become more scientific by shifting its attention from relatively insignificant kings and soldiers to equally insignificant common folks. History becomes scientific in proportion as it advances from knowledge of details toward reconstruction of the whole in which the details have their place. The sociologists have entered the field of social science with a plea for a fair share of attention to that correlation of knowledge, notorious neglect of which has thus far been the paradox of our era of "inductive science.
Recurring to the titles from Stubbs, we may add that investigation of such details may, and indeed must, proceed in the first instance with severe disregard of collateral details. The test of historical work, however, is not where it begins, but where it ends. It is a misconception of fact and a misuse of terms to speak of any. The output of that technique is raw material of science. There is no more scientific value in knowing merely that William the Conqueror, or William the Red, or any of their successors in past centuries, did this or that, than there is in knowing what Edward VII.
We do not reach science till we advance from knowledge of what occurred to knowledge of the meaning of what occurred. On the side of the meanings of occurrences, whoever follows connections as far as they can be traced, whether he calls himself historian or sociologist, pursues the essential sociological interest.
Happily it is impossible for the most atomistically minded historiographer utterly to overlook the pointings of each event or situation toward connections with other events and situations. Even a list of topics like the one we have cited at random testifies of this necessity.
Moreover, the relationships implied are not merely those of nearness in time or space, nor of series. They are relationships of working-with, of process.
This process may be contemplated merely within an arbitrarily restricted area; e. In this case there is rudimentary, but narrowly restricted, recognition that specific knowledge gets its value by correlation with other knowledge. The interest of the historian converges toward that of the sociologist in the precise degree in which the former desires to advance from knowledge of occurrences as such, not merely to their immediate correlations, but to their last discoverable meanings as indexes of the whole process of social evolution.
At one extreme is sheer interest in bare details. At the other extreme is interest that rates everything short of dynamic interpretation of the details as mere preliminary. The same distinction may be stated in terms of discrimination between the economic and the sociological interest. Again, it should be urged with all emphasis that every use of words which implies an exclusive division of subject-matter among the social sciences is merely a convenient concession to a condition which the progress of science should at least mitigate.
As we have said above, from the sociological viewpoint different workers in the social sciences are not working on different kinds of material. They are merely carrying on different divisions of labor upon one material. That material is human experience in general.
The total purpose of social science, up to the point where it ceases to be mere knowledge and begins to pass over into power, is to discover the meanings of human experience. Our present illustration. Instead of selecting our illustration from economic topics which are extremely fractional, as it would be easy to do, we prefer to take specimens of a sort more representative of recent tendencies. His first major book, General Sociology , viewed the subject matter of sociology as the processes by which various group interests clash and become resolved through accommodations and social innovation.
In this work, he summarized and creatively interpreted the writings of Ludwig Gumplowicz and Gustave Ratzenhofer for the first time in English. Further interpretations of European thinkers were included in Adam Smith and Modern Sociology , where Small tried to demonstrate the moral and philosophical undergirding of Smith's famous Wealth of Nations; The Cameralists , an extremely detailed review of the social theory underlying the public economic policies of Germany from the 16th through the 19th century; and Origins of Sociology , a highly erudite reconstruction of German academic controversies that seemed to Small to provide the foundation of modern methodology in social science.
The best summary of Small's overall thinking is contained in The Meaning of Social Science , where the thrust of his General Sociology is clarified in surprisingly modern terms. Essentially, social science—including sociology—studies continuing processes through which men form, implement, and change valuations of their experiences.
Human behavior derives meaning from these valuations, and both values and behavior are simultaneously patterned in the individual as personality and in society through groups and organizations. Small retired from the university in He died in Chicago on March 24, Small" in Howard W.
Odum and others, eds. Stern, Historical Sociology Email Print. Read more. Latest headlines. Looking for someone? Van Depoele Andrew Z. Fire Casey Kasem.
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