VISIT WEBSITE >>>>> http://gg.gg/y83ws?6993206 <<<<<<
Decentralisation has been advocated by donors and development agencies as an instrument to ensure broader participation of citizens as well as to improve local governance leading to poverty reduction from the bottom up.
On the basis of a comprehensive review of nine case studies documented in the literature, this study questions this assumption. According to our findings, a clear link between decentralisation and a reduction in poverty cannot be established. Two important policy lessons emerge from this study. First, in an environment where the central state barely fulfils basic functions and is not interested in giving power and resources to local tiers of government, decentralisation should not be a priority for donors as it could be rather counter-productive.
Second, in countries that fulfil basic prerequisites, decentralisation could be a powerful tool for poverty reduction. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. At the same time, these associations are largely dominated by the elites, thus the provision does not empower the poor and the socially excluded [Crook, ].
In South Africa civil society is facing serious financial problems. On the other hand, countries that are less successful in reaching pro-poor outcomes through decentralisation are characterised by a weak, often elite-dominated civil society e.
Administrative Factors: Countering Corruption, Capacity Building and the Role of the Central State Elite capture and corruption Table 2 underlines the emergence of elite capture and corruption when these factors constituted an obstacle to pro-poor outcomes.
In reality, there is no example of the non-occurrence of elite capture or corruption across all nine case studies. Community-based participatory approaches are not a panacea.
Never- theless, positive performers tend to be less marked by elite capture and corruption than negative performers. At least, in these cases, there is an awareness of the need for action and the countries concerned are putting in place measures to counter corruption and to monitor administrative behaviour e. In negatively performing countries, decentralisation is often seen as part of a patrimonial agenda aimed at preserving the monopoly of power and ensuring control over resources. Capacity building Most countries in the process of decentralisation experience some form of interference from central government.
This can be direct e. Central governments tend to legitimise their interference in local policies by pointing to a lack of capacity in local government. In reality, this argument hides mainly their unwillingness to delegate power.
While all positive performers are characterised by strong local human capacity, often it does not precede the decentralisation reforms. Table 2 shows that all positive performers invested in building local capacity. At the same time, the literature gives evidence that local government capacity can increase as a consequence of decentralisation [Rondinelli et al.
Common to negative performers is the considerable lack of pre-existing local human capacity and very little support from the central state in favour of training during reform. This is even more essential in environments with high inequalities based on traditional social institutions, e. Recent research on India suggests that giving power to local tiers of government is not sufficient to increase the participation of marginalised groups, in particular women [Narayana, ].
The central state has to ensure that existing social inequalities are taken into account and are not re-enforced once decentralisation has started. Indeed this seems to have been the case in Uganda where judicial reform favoured local councils that often discriminate against women.
To have a pro- poor impact, decentralisation should be accompanied by complementary measures such as investment in education or the promotion of land reform. Whereas it is undisputed that for public goods with inter-jurisdictional spill-over effects e. While the case studies demonstrate that positively performing countries had a clearer division of functions between the centre and the periphery, it does not shed light on which functions should be delegated and to what extent.
Nevertheless, it seems that even in a decentralised system, the central government has an important role to play. Fiscal: Stable and Type of Resources The last column of Table 2 shows that decentralisation has been successful, in terms of pro-poor objectives, only when local governments disposed of sufficient resources to fulfil their new tasks. A study on India found a significant correlation between the health conditions of the rural poor, measured by the infant mortality rate in rural areas, and fiscal decentralisation [Asfaw et al.
Lack of resources and freedom in allocating them seem to have been a general problem for those countries in which decentralisation did not bring about pro-poor outcomes. However, there are no data in the case studies for the latter. In many of the positively performing countries, resources at the local level have come both from transfers and local taxes e.
Independent and substantial tax-raising powers seem to be a major criterion for successful pro- poor decentralisation, e. China [Von Braun and Grote, ]. However, these tend to increase regional inequalities from an economic and social point of view as happened in China.
Needs-based transfers from the central government are helpful in targeting the poor [Bird and Rodriguez, ]. In Bolivia 20 per cent of the budget is automatically allocated to local governments each year. However, transfers should not be tied by the central government and constitute the only funding of local policies as they will leave local governments with no decision- making autonomy, e. Uganda [Scott-Herridge ].
An important element for successful poverty-focused decentralisation is whether local governments have the power to allocate resources. Limited or no ability to decide on expenditure is an impediment to pro-poor decentralisation as it leads to poor local responsiveness to local needs. While the central government can still follow successful pro-poor policies as is the case of Uganda , the benefits which might stem from bringing governments closer to the people are not fully exploited.
All of the negative performers are characterised by extremely limited financial resources, that is to say, limited or tied transfers and limited or no local tax-raising powers. Although it is certainly true that unrestricted power to decide on expenditures or arbitrary decisions bears the risk of increased elite capture and corruption and can be a threat to macroeconomic stability, e. Philippines [Tanzi, ], freedom to decide how to spend resources is essential for effective pro-poor decentralisation.
Many authors underline the importance of the structure of the transfer system and call for the establishment of monitoring instruments [Bird and Rodriguez, ; Crook, ; Crook and Sverrisson, ]. The last column of Table 2 also highlights a common problem in local tax-raising capacity, which is more evident in negatively performing countries due to the phenomena of local tax evasion.
This can be ascribed to a lack of tax-raising legitimacy of local governments e. Guinea and South Africa to a certain extent. In Uganda, tax evasion is aggravated by the unwillingness of local authorities to impose taxes mainly those on the rich and the recent reliance on private collectors that tend to capture part of the resources [Francis and James, ].
Despite reviewing the literature for nine, regionally dispersed, countries it is nearly impossible to find hard, measurable evidence of the impact of decentralisation on poverty.
This is an important area for future research. Nevertheless, reviewing the reported outcomes in the nine countries, and linking them back to inputs and process, provides interesting patterns of pro-poor decentralisation processes. On the contrary, while positive experiences in terms of improved access to services and empowerment have been reported in some countries — notably Bolivia and in some Indian states — the picture is rather gloomy in most African countries.
Reforms in African countries have been limited to administrative deconcentration — with very little or no positive impact on poverty reduction. The political economy of reform processes in countries characterised by weak governance systems and capacities often makes a full delegation of powers and resources unlikely.
Hence, key factors of success for pro-poor decentralisation seem to be a real devolution of power and resources while establishing accountability systems. As decentralisation involves a redistribution of power and can generate opposition from those who will be negatively affected by it, it can only be effective and generate pro-poor outcomes if there is a strong commitment from central government and political leaders: ownership and objectives of the reforms are decisive.
While there is potential for poverty reduction through democratic decentralisation, there are also some hidden dangers such as reinforcing local elites.
Finally, the review of case studies suggests that in a decentralised system the central state retains an important role in leading and monitoring the reform process. Two important policy lessons for donors can be taken from these findings: 1. Donors should be more aware of the political economy of decentralisation as a change process. Decentralisation is a political process that will not produce gains on all sides: as with all reforms it creates winners and losers. Various forms of compensation should be considered.
Donors should promote reforms on several levels within the government, including at the intermediate levels that have an administrative and political role to play.
Otherwise reforms will not produce sustainable results. Donors should emphasise the instrumental character of decentralisation in creating an enabling environment for poverty reduction at local levels.
Decentralisation should be promoted as an important instrument for poverty reduction, not as an end in itself. As the link between decentralisation and poverty reduction is not straightforward, donors should work to straighten this link by putting pressure on governments for pro-poor outcomes, constantly monitoring the process and adopting flexible, impact-oriented learning-by- doing and country-specific policies.
Indeed, those changes are arguably achievable, according to Gray Molina and Whitehead, with the continued participation of the local communities. This is clearly an approach to poverty, thinking in building institutions and offering human development to the communities inside a country.
In this sense, there is an approach by those mentioned practiotioners to poverty in terms of thinking in politics, in the interactions and dynamics of politics and in creating the environment inside a country able to produce benefits to the poor. So far, it could be said that designing pro-poor policies or strategies to reduce poverty is about pro-poor politics, participation of social movements, targeting groups to be benefited and the commitment of the governments and elites.
Jutting et al. They have very similar approaches, because they coincide in that in a country where the government is not interested in offering power to local leaders or communities, decentralisation is not going to produce change in the benefit of the poor, but rather more problems.
In this sense, both Unsworth and Jutting et al. All in all, these topics are relevant to those who studied development, because they permit to observe and analyse what is pro-poor politics and how these should be having in mind in order to come with the best approach to promote poverty reduction, an arguably objective in international development issues. Personally, I have learned from these themes that pro-poor policies, strategies and decisions for reducing poverty are necessarily correlated with sound politics and the commitment of elites and governments to be accountable with their populations.
In the same sense, it is important an environment in where social movements can act without restrictions and in a continued dialogue between the poor and their rulers in order to understand poverty as a problem of everybody in a country.
As outlined above, discussions over politics seems to be essential to face poverty in the world, in where every country has a history and unique features which are indispensable for having into account when studying the situation of a territory in terms of lack of opportunities and poverty. To conclude, one could argue that without a reasonable study and analysis of the complexities, characteristics, political interests and local life stories of every single community, territory and leaders, it seems difficult to offer alternatives and projects which can impact over poverty, in a positive form, inside a country.
Jutting, J, E. Corsi, C. Kauffmann, I.
Comments